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Within a decade, Kosovo has compromised twice: accepting 
the process of decentralization in order to achieve 
independence and international recognition, through the 
President Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement (2 February 2007), and finally, by 
approving to offer autonomy for Kosovo Serbs for the 
sovereignty, but still within the limits of the Ahtisaari Plan.  
Coincidentally, the same Serbian political parties which had 
fought three wars, resulting in dissolution of the state (Former 
Yugoslavia) at that time (the Socialist Party and the Serbian 
Radical Party), now are in power in the Republic of Serbia, and 
have the possibility to finally solve the Kosovo case, and to 
open the perspective for this part, Europe’s black hole, to be 
engaged in global integration. Statements by senior Serbian 
politicians are positively shifting, compared to the 
radicalization of the relations between Albanians and Serbs 
three decades ago and it is believed that the developments will 
evolve towards rational choice and acceptance by the parties. 
Being under pressure by difficult socio-economic situation and 
need for integration processes, both sides undertake risky and 
unpopular steps by signing unclear political and verbal 
agreements on normalization of relations, which may produce 
difficult solving externalities in the future. The risk lies in the 
possibility of further damaging the Kosovo’s “piece of the 
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cake”, after every refusal step by the Serbian side, which will damage the 
interest of Kosovo side according to the “zero sum” game. Analyses of the 
dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia reflect the mixed benefits to 
the parties, resulting in not very soon European integration, and with hope 
on difficult but necessary reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs in the 
region. The broken, after the war established, status quo is better than 
entering into a protracted conflict in the middle of Europe. 
 





The EU, interested to capitalize the last unresolved dispute in its yard, 
between Kosovo and Serbia, supported by US, firstly pushed Serbia to 
agree to hold EU-facilitated talks with Kosovo on technical issues, rather 
than on political and the question of Kosovo’s status. After rounds of talks 
on technical items, the Commission recommended that Serbia be given the 
status of a membership candidate if it re-engages in the dialogue with 
Kosovo and implements already reached agreements. Secondly, the 
Commission recommended that Serbia be given a date to begin 
membership negotiations if it achieved further steps in normalizing its 
relations with Kosovo. Under worst socio-economic circumstances and 
political instability, both countries were pressurised to undertake risky and 
unpopular political agreement on normalization of relations1 as a key 
toward international integrations. Agreement was followed by positive 
reflections by international institutions2 and with certain degree of mistrust 
and criticism by internal factors and population.  
“We do not want to isolate Serbia from the rest of the world, but we 
have to protect our interests. It is highly important that we reach an 
                                                 
1 Text of historic agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, Friday 19 April 2013, available 
from: http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/3609.aspx?&blogitemid=1723, 
accessed 21 January 2014. 
2 Serbia and Kosovo reach landmark deal, available from:  
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm, 
accessed 21 January, 2014. 
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agreement.” 3 This sentence expresses the “rationalism of the Serbian 
politics” regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement with Kosovo 
on Kosovo-Serbia dialogue mediated by the High Representative of the 
European Union, Catherine Ashton. The wording of the sentence indicates 
the tendency of Serbia for a win-lose solution. This policy is also a base of 
what happened during the 90's when Serbia was allowed to pursue their 
prey for other territories of Former Yugoslavia. Aggressive behavior of 
Serbia related to Kosovo is a result of the stony-faced Serbian expansionist 
philosophy and mentality of artificially created myth "Kosovo-cradle of 
Serbia", which was often and silently accepted by certain political circles in 
Europe and the world. This paper will analyze the performance of 
negotiating delegations at certain stages of the process towards "self - 
interest as the foundation of political behavior"4, meaning achievements of 
the highest benefits5 associated with the requests of the parties.  
Rational Choice Theory as a scientific approach and mechanism to 
analyze the human behavior in political decision-making is used as a basis 
to analyze the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue held during April 2013.  
In addition, will be explained the tendency of both parties to extract as 
much internal resources as possible which are influential in their decision 
about possible outcomes. 
The agreement reached between the two most warring populations in 
the Balkans, Albanians and Serbs, is very important and brings a new 
quality in the behavior among other populations in the region. The purpose 
of this article is to analyze the perspective of the Kosovo-Serbian dialogue 
in light of Rational Choice Theory and models derived from this theory 
such as Rational Actor, Organizational Process, and Government Policies, 
                                                 
3 Serbia rejects EU-brokered deal for Kosovo, calls for more negotiations, available from: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/serbian-official-serbia-will-reject-eu-
brokered-deal-for-kosovo/2013/04/08/13a9ccca-a03b-11e2-bd52-
614156372695_story.html , Associated Press,  accessed April 8, 2013. 
4 Downs, Antoni. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 2005. p. 
22. Taken from Debu Ghandi, Rational Choice Theory in Political Science: Mathematically 
Rigorous but Flawed in Implementation, Critique: A worldwide Journal Politics, faqe 81. 
Available from  
http://lilt.ilstu.edu/critique/spring2005docs/DebuRationalChoicePaper.pdf, last access-
ed 16 April 2013. 
5 Serbian PM Ivica Dačić: State officials demonstrate complete unity “Kosovo has been given 
elements of subjectivity that we now cannot dispute and we need to try to save as much as we 
can”. Available from: http://www.invest-in-serbia.com/government-activities/3152-pm-state-
officials-demonstrate-complete-unity.html , accessed, 20 January, 2014. 
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which are very often overlapped and do not have any sharp line of division 
in order to distinguish them. Emphasis is on the individual level of 
analysis, in particular on the two heads of negotiators. The article was 
written immediately after the acceptance of the agreement from the two 
parts and as a result the documents accompanying the agreement might 
not have complete information and as such their content may result in an 
error in the analysis. 
 
2. Opening of the negotiations  
 
Serbian governments and politics were not silent before, and especially 
not after the sad news to them that the International Court of Justice has 
acknowledged Kosovo’s independence6, which confirmed the regularity of 
Independence Proclamation. After EU request on normalizing the relations 
between disputed sides,7 as a way toward integration processes and US 
support,8 both countries recognized that there are no other choices, except 
negotiations, including political ones. Prior the political talks, Kosovo and 
Serbia discussed and achieved several technical agreements9. 
The rejection by Serbia, of the first version of the agreement offered by 
EU mediator, C.Ashton, had a dual purpose: to provoke the possibility of 
revising the first version to be more "accessible" to Serbia as well as the 
possibility of selling it’s “yes” for a higher price in terms of the benefit aid 
                                                 
6 Press Release by ICJ, available from: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf, 
last accessed , 19 April, 2013. 
7 See Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilization and Association Process, 3210 
General Affairs Council Meeting in Brussels available from:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/134234
.pdf, last accessed 12 May 2013. Also, See EU Commission Enlargement Strategy 2012-
2013: available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/strategy_paper_2
012_en.pdf ,  
8 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Testimony of Tracey Ann Jacobson 
Ambassador-Designate to Kosovo” „normalisation of relations require a durable modus 
vivendi that respects Kosovo’s sovereignty, takes into account the views of the citizens of 
the north, and allows both Kosovo and Serbia to proceed on their respective Euro-Atlantic 
paths.” March 21, 2012, available at:  
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/nomination-3-21-12. Last accessed, 24 Decem-
ber, 2013. 
9 See KIPRED, Policy Paper No. 4/13, July 2013, The Implementation of Agreements of 
Kosovo-Serbia Political Dialogue. 
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package by the EU. With this, both leaders will be justified before their 
citizens by saying that "we did what we could at best and there are no 
chances of dealing with the entire world to have Kosovo under Serbia", as 
determined by the Serbian constitution. In a such maneuver in order to 
extract as much influential sources in its foreign policy, Serbia included 
also religious factor, the Serbian Orthodox Church, in an effort to prove to 
the of international factors that the political position of the Serbian 
leadership is the voice of the people articualated through religious 
attitude10 (shows the state insecularity) as pressure on its leadership toward 
the outcome of agreement with Kosovo. In this case, the views of some 
political parties and influential figures in the former Serbian policy on 
accelerated need to accept the plan offered by the EU mediator were not 
taken into account. Furthermore, Serbia seems to have given up toward 
rational choice, accepting painful steps for Serbia related to Kosovo, as 
stated by Serbian deputy prime minister A. Vučić.11 After continuing and 
additional concessions due to the Serbian requests, the agreement was 
accepted and had mostly positive opinions in Serbia, except the reaction 
from V. Kostunica’s party, who classified the agreement as betrayal and 
made threatening statements toward Serbia's negotiation leaders.  
In the process, the Serbian side maximized its gains while the Kosovar 
side showed not enough aggressiveness in maximizing the necessary value 
of externalities, as theory states12, which had the effect of the new version, 
which was poorer and at the expense of Kosovo. In Kosovo there were 
mixed reactions, from those who have given qualification hymns of glory, 
to those aiming to sabotage the ongoing state-building in Kosovo and 
continuation of involvement by Serbia into Kosovo internal affairs and 
temptation by Self-Determination Movement to obstruct voting at the 
Assembly.  
                                                 
10 Serbian Patriarch Irinej appealed on behalf of the Serbian Church, to the Serbian head of 
state to not deviate from the pre-election promises and electoral belief that at this time " in 
stormy and turbulent circumstances not to sell, betray Kosovo and Metohija ", available 
from: 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=08&nav_category=
640&nav_id=703000, last accessed, April 8, 2013. 
11Vucic Warns Serbia of ‘Painful’ Kosovo Decisions, available from: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vucic-warns-serbia-of-painful-kosovo-
decisions accessed 23 May, 2013. 
12 Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. A behavioral Approach to the rational Choice Theory of Collective 
Action Presidential Address, American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No.1, 1998. p. 9. 
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3. Dialogue as a rational approach on solving the Kosovo-Serbia 
dispute  
 
The Kosovo Assembly, on 18th October 2012 adopted a “Resolution on 
Normalization of Relations between Republic of Kosovo and Republic of 
Serbia” which supported the process of negotiations, stating that every 
agreement should be in compliance with the Kosovo Constitution and not 
about political issues, conditioned if that is the case then they must be 
ratified by the Assembly. However, the level of negotiations shifted to very 
political matters.13 Kosovo’s delegation closure toward public of ongoing 
processes raised the fear and suspicion to the people and opposition 
political parties on possible worst outputs from the negotiations.14 
In the past, Kosovo and Serbia had some confrontational dialogues 
between them since 1999 until now; the Rambouillet Agreement, the 
negotiations for the status led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, 
those of "technical issue", and last round of settlement for northern Kosovo 
or as stated in the original version, “The first agreement of principles that 
lead to the normalization of relations". Besides some technical issues, which 
began to be implemented mutualy, three other proposals mediated and 
proposed by the international factor were not accepted by Serbia. Through 
the dialogue style "pull but do not snap", through rejecting the initial offer, 
Serbia benefited by making significant reductions to the agreement at the 
expense of Kosovo’s positions. It turned to the medieval decision-making 
when role of church was crucial15, thinking and understanding of dialogue 
as a means to benefit only one party, in this case-Serbia. Such "rebel" 
Serbian behavior never produced any benefits, except the last one, but did 
prevent Kosovo’s stabilization, state-building and its peace building. Once 
Serbia "won" bombs in response, the next time the dialogue lasted for four 
                                                 
13 Interview for Radio Free Europe, 04 October, 2011, Hashim Thaçi said: Political dialogue 
with Serbia isn’t at Prishtina, Brusseles and Washington table, available from: 
http://www.evropaelire.org/content/article/24348764.html, last accessed, 23 December, 
2013. The same expressions were used by other Kosovo politicians, President Jahjaga, 
Deputy Prime minister Tahiri... 
14 See more at: Group for Legal and Political Studies, KOSOVO–SERBIA DIALOGUE: 
Windows of Opportunity or a House of Cards? Policy Analysis Number 03 - March 2013 
15 Samet Dalipi, (I)Racionaliteti vendimmarrjës në dialogun Kosovë-Serbi, Bota Sot, April 13, 
2013, p. 13. 
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months16 without any shift from the initial position. Some of the "technical 
agreements" were reached in practical application. Acceptance of the 
second version happened after it has been convinced that the solution of 
the "hot" problem of northern Kosovo with this kind of offered autonomy 
will find comfort and durability in long-term relations between the two 
countries. In return for this "yes" - Serbia benefits the EU integration 
perspective, starting the negotiations for accession to EU17.  
Despite the initial rejection of the agreement, Serbian leaders did not 
expect (to the right) negative reaction for their decision, they were 
convinced on the continuity of the dialogue18. These same attitudes were 
held by some circles close to the Serbian philosophy who requested to 
disagree with the offered proposal and, possibly, to be transferred to the 
UN, even though they knew that this was not a real option19. 
As they expected, but also with the request of Kosovo’s Prime Minister, 
who insisted on dialogue, Baroness Ashton called on negotiators for 
another meeting on April 17, 2013, in Brussels, to once again give the 
opportunity, as she says" turning cradle of war into the cradle of peace"20 in 
the Balkan region. Surprisingly, American Ambassador in Belgrade 
Michael Kirby announced that Serbia will get the date for accession to EU 
even without reaching an agreement with Kosovo21. In such circumstances, 
the Serbian side was in the position to define the limits under which the 
Serb position can not fall, and that, according to Serbian President Nikolić, 
                                                 
16 French proposal on extending round of talks for four months on the Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement was last attempt of achieving consensus, which 
the Serbian side again rejected. 
17 Serbia’s long path to EU Accession, available from: http://www.dw.de/serbias-long-
path-to-eu-accession/a-17374164 , last accessed, 24 January 2014. 
18 Vučić: SNS decision not to sign the agreement, available from:  
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/376313/Vucic-Odluka-SNS-je-da-se-ne-potpise-
sporazum , last accessed 8 April, 2013. 
19 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/376241/Nikolic-Insistiracemo-da-se-pregovara-pod-
okriljem-organizacije-ciji-smo-clan , last accessed 8 April, 2013. 
20 Aston, Catherine. 2013. Normalizing Relations Between Kosovo and Serbia, New York 
Times, Published: April 25, 2013  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/opinion/global/Ashton-Normalizing-relations-
Between-Kosovo-and-Serbia.html?ref=catherineashton , last accessed 26 April, 2013. 
21 Ambasador SAD Majkl Kirbi kaže da postoji mogućnost da Srbija dobije u junu datum za 
početak pregovora o članstvu u EU i bez dogovora s Prištinom u Briselu. Available from: 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=17&nav_id=705937, 
last accessed, 20 September, 2013. 
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full extension of Kosovo institutions in northern Kosovo, especially of the 
police, judiciary and army presence22, because this would eliminate the 
presence of Serbia in Kosovo, and for this they also have the support of the 
people of Serbia23. In this case, what attributes of state sovereignty 
remained to Kosovo, where, Serbia, did not foresee the same rights for 
Albanian minority community in Serbia? Finally, neither side won those 
which had designated as their red lines.24  
 
4. Analysis of such Decision-making 
  
The flow of the unresolved issues, after the international intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999 and to a tolerance of self-awareness of local and 
international mechanisms in northern Kosovo developments, is the present 
negotiating process in Kosovo. 
Serbia once again managed to insert the issue of Kosovo through the 
small door in the negotiation process after its long support and persistence 
from countries with secessionist movement problems and the fear of the 
impact of the specificity of Kosovo, despite the views of the states that have 
recognized Kosovo as a special case. To the Serbian rhetoric offensive, 
Kosovar leadership and international policymakers didn’t resist not 
opening the doors to political negotiations, besides technical issues with 
Serbia. 
                                                 
22 Ten Serbians requirements for the agreement: Association of Serb Municipalities will have 
a president, parliament and executive council ( government ) seek regional police 
commander , the Court of Appeal should be in the northern , southern part of Mitrovica , 
Skenderaj and Vushtrria can not be part of the Association of Serb Municipalities ; 
Prishtina Army can not go into the territory of the Union of Serb Municipalities , 
Association of Serbian municipalities dispose of their property ; powers of the Serb 
Community municipalities in education, health , spatial planning , culture, information , 
environmental protection , agriculture , forestry , water economy , mining , all powers 
could financially support Serbia ; Guarantees for the status of the Orthodox Serbian 
Church ( SPC ) and the protection of cultural heritage ; text the agreement will guarantee 
European Union . In http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/dhjete-kerkesat-e-serbise-per-
marreveshje-2-31129.html, last accessed, 14 April, 2013 . 
23 Nikolić: There is a limit to which Serbia must not exceed, available from:  
http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/nikolic-ekziston-kufiri-te-cilin-serbia-nuk-guxon-ta-
kaloje-2-31120.html, last accessed, April 16, 2013. 
24 This, at least seen in a first published version by the electronic media Kosovo without a 
quality of translation, available from: http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/ja-cfare-shkruan-
ne-marreveshje-2-31241.html, last accessed, 19 April, 2013. 
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Analysis of decision making in Kosovo - Serbia dialogue can be 
simplified through very essential questions: which are the benefits for 
Kosovo, which are for Serbia and also the identification of mutual benefits.  
The Kosovo side went to dialogue in favorable positions for, but with 
the undermining that dialogue is necessary for developments in Kosovo 
and would produce certain concessions to lure the northern part of Kosovo 
to be integrated into the overall building of the entire state of Kosovo. The 
dialogue between the parties was war in defense of the constitutionality of 
the Republic of Kosovo and efforts to damage as much as possible by 
providing greater competencies to northern residents. 
Political premise of entering into a dialogue for the parties to resolve 
certain problems is that of maximizing the benefits through minimizing 
eliminations of as many of their proposed solutions. This is the principle of 
rational choice theory. But if both sides insist on their proposals, more 
populist rather than instrumental and rational, they will enter into a 
centrifugal vortex clash with hardly reparable possibilities; in this case the 
space for constructivism, will disappear. 
Beside Kosovo’s party behavior, which was cooperative and readily 
accepted the content of the agreement, this wasn’t the case with the Serbian 
party. Kosovo delegation’s behaviour was in accordance with broader 
support by the Kosovo influential factors in the decision-making, despite 
the refusal to be part of the negotiating team. Prime Minister of Kosovo, not 
calculating the cost and benefits, lens impression of losing characteristics of 
Rational Actor, calling for continued dialogue implying that Kosovo is 
more eager than Serbia to reach agreement, while the Serbian side rejected 
it as such because "it does not guarantee complete safety and protection of 
human rights of the Serbs in Kosovo”, and for that reason, “Serbia's 
government will not accept the principles presented orally before its 
negotiating team in Brussels"25 said Dačić, while the same government is 
not going to provide the same conditions for its Albanian citizens in the 
south part of Serbia26. It even happened. Usually, compromise means 
                                                 
25 Available from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/04/ 201348211411648-
112.html, last accessed, 14 April, 2013.  
26 During the period of negotiations, Serbia launched several activities against Albanians in 
south part of her. Police forces removed the statue of Albanian veterans from the square in 
Preshevo, confiscated the books from Albanian schools. Justice institutions released the 
“Gjilani group” after five years in prison because they found not guilty. See article by 
Branko Filipovic, Police remove Albanian rebel memorial in south Serbia, available from: 
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omission spun to unsatisfied, Serbia. However, in this mess of a dialogue, 
Kosovo did benefit from demand (which was not paved but stayed in the 
subconscious of both parties) to implement a symmetrical arrangement 
which will apply to the Albanians in southern Serbia27 which, we believe, 
has contributed towards the reduction of the Serbian delegation 
requirements for Serbs in northern Kosovo. 
A notable element of the dialogue momentum was temptation by Serbia 
to establish closer ties with the other rival of West, Russia. While efforts 
were made to find possibilities of reconciliation between the parties, Serbia 
continuously put double diplomatic pressure to democratic countries of the 
EU and on the other hand conducting negotiations with Russia to join the 
Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, which has an observer 
status28. Soon, the official Russian position appeared "respecting the 
position that whatever Serbia agrees on, is acceptable for Russia". At the 
same time, raising the possibility by the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade of 
obtaining the date by Serbia for EU membership without reaching an 
agreement, urged Serbia for aggressive demands on the draft agreement. 
These factors were significant pruning of the initial version of draft 
agreement. 
Governments and international actors, in such cases as this historical 
dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, should have Standard Operating 
Procedures or good calculated alternative strategies based on the model of 
Organizational Process. Kosovo’s delegation did not give the impression 
(publicly) that it had something like that or at least admit that it had a 
prepared plan. 
Based on the Government Policy pattern, the commitment of the two 
parties was that of solving the problem through dialogue, with the 
exception of a little bit more extreme groups, like Self-determination 
                                                                                                                            
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/20/us-serbia-albanians-tensions-
idUSBRE90J0AJ20130120 , last accessed, 19 November 2013, or related to released group, 
available from: http://www.kosovapress.com/en/nacional/serbian-war-crimes-court-
released-gjilan-group-5789/, last accessed 19 November 2013, about confiscation of 
around five thousand books, available from:  
http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/perfundon-operacioni-serb-ne-shkollen-shqiptare-ne-
presheve-u-konfiskuan-5-mije-libra-2-37796.html , last accessed 19 November 2013. 
27 Samet Dalipi, ibid. 
28 Serbia became a member of the Warsaw Pact successor: Belgrade military alliance with 
Russia! available from: http://www.jutarnji.hr/srbija-u-vojnom-savezu-odkb-s-rusima-
protiv-nato-a-/1097515/, last accessed, 17 April, 2013. 
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Movement in Kosovo and some parties within Serbia, which refused the 
dialogue, arguing that the Kosovo government should spread its authority 
in the north of Kosovo by sending police and security forces, or statements 
by the Serbian extremists that Kosovo is part of Serbia. 
Kosovo Prime Minister had offered to build a joint team of Kosovar 
political spectrum but, apart from the opposition Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo, AAK, others had refused participation, one to support the 
dialogue, the Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK, providing it should not 
come out of the frames of the Kosovo Constitution, and Self-Determination 
Movement, VV, which had opposed the dialogue itself. According to this 
model, inconsistencies within political parties will produce growing 
speculation of those who will be unhappy with the results of the dialogue. 
While regarding the Kosovo Prime Minister, it can be said that the dialogue 
process was “at his hand" and without interferences in his decision, it can 
not be said that it was the same for his counterpart Dačić, to whom was 
located the head of the serbian governing party, Vučić, in the role of 
supervisor but also as distributor of responsibility through various Serb 
political entities. This act of "constricted ranks" in the Serbian delegation 
that refused first draft agreement, an action that would be seen as later, 
went in favor of the Serbian delegation, to win the second more qualitative 
option according to Serbian requirements. However, aware of the 
unpopularity of the agreed document, Prime Minister Thaçi will call it 
"rational agreement, not ideal"29. 
Decision makers in this dialogue had their advantages and drawbacks. 
The advantage of the Kosovar side degraded with time, while inferior 
Serbian positions came more rational compared with the original. 
 
                                                 
29 Thaçi: rational agreement, is not ideal, available from:  
http://kohaditore.com/?page=1,13, 143240, last accessed, 20 April, 2013. 
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Figure 1. Performance process by Kosovo and Serbian negotiating parties 
 
Source: Authors’ own information 
 
In the reached agreement, the pressure from the economic situation and 
constantly scraping welfare quality of the citizens of Serbia and Kosovo 
and a hope that it will open the possibilities for economic revival had also 
huge influence. The dialogue showed division trends based on ethnicity, 
losing the chance, right now, for a multi-ethnic society, vigorously 
propagated by local and international mechanisms. Tendencies to maintain 
negativities on the issue of the obstruction of integration processes 
appeared when Serbia preserved the right to obstruct Kosovo become UN 
member but not preventing it from EU integrations, calculating that it can 
do the same with several orthodox political circles within EU countries for 
their ignorance and complicated long-term procedures for Kosovo 
membership in the EU. Therefore, Serbia managed to remove its 
responsibility and ‘sold’ itself as ‘moderate’ to member States of the EU, 
part of which family it intends to be, but Kosovo seams not to gain 
something very important in the process. With the created30 autonomy the 
roads for Serbs opened wherever they are, they will have the possibility of 
dual citizenship and freedom of movement in Europe. Kosovo Albanians 
                                                 
30 Ashton, ibid. In the end, both sides did find common ground on the level of autonomy the 
Kosovar Serbs should enjoy. 
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remain isolated even further, because of fragile institutions31 challenging 
the future peacebuilding processes. Paradoxically, the agreement will 
breach the status quo but would be a “bad intertwined rope at the foot” of 
the Kosovo institutions in its future developments. 
The main global influencing factors to the Kosovo crisis have the 
powerful tools to establish the sustainable peace in the last disturbed part 
of Europe, the economic aid, accession to EU32, friendship and emotional 
relations of kosovars to USA.  
Kosovo will keep its territorial integrity, that is a stabilizing factor, will 
manage to enforce its laws, but will be challenged by the level of 
competencies which will be managed by the association of municipalities, 
courts and police which in north will be dominated by Serbs, who can be 
disconcerting factor in certain situations. The dialogue will produce 
detention in relations between the two nations, but also the efforts to find 
symmetry for the Albanians who compose three municipalities in South 
Serbia, which will push forward the peace building process in the region. 
In those circumstances there ate chances for increasement of the number of 
Kosovo recognitions from the international community and the level of 
integration in various international mechanisms.  
Final and most important negotiated product will be a reasonable 
compromise: territorial integrity of Kosovo with the certain degree of 
autonomy for the Serb minority in Kosovo. 
 
5. The agreement implementation obstacles and benefits 
 
Serbia continuously is engaged in persuading international mechanisms 
not to recognize Kosovo. The EU is not going to push Serbia to change this 
view immediately. 
                                                 
31 Dalipi, S. (2012) Institutional fragility-challenge for peacebuilding in Kosovo, Iliria 
International Review, 2012/2, pp. 135-146. available from:  
http://www.uiliria.org/iir/file/10_Samet_Dalipi.pdf , last accessed, 11 May, 2013. 
32 On 28 June, 2013, The Decisions authorising the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo* have been 
adopted, point 20, and to open accession negotiations with Serbia latest by January 2014, 
pending full implementation of the agreement reached with Kosovo in April 2013,  
available from:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/137634.pdf, 
last accessed, 21 September 2013. 
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The process of negotiations was followed by daily basis incidents at the 
Kosovo North part. Targets were politicians, usually members willing to 
participate in Kosovo institutions and others.33 Also, the dynamics of 
implementation of the agreement will be followed by incidents or unrest 
activities because of radical views by Kosovo Serbs individuals and 
political leaders. Lack of timetable activities will produce infinite delays 
and possibilities for future damage to the process of peacebuilding in 
Kosovo and region. 
The process of implementation of the negotiated topics34 seems to be 
difficult and time consuming. Problems occurred during the local election 
process in November 2013 and the murder of Dimitrije Janičijević, 
assembly member and candidate for mayor of Northern Mitrovica,35 from 
the Liberal Party, an ethnic Serb party that is part of Kosovo's Albanian-
dominated coalition government. These are all are evidence of uncertainty 
of implementation process. All these occurrences are a result of strongly 
expressed statement that Serbia will never recognize Kosovo as 
independent state, which energizes the radical behaviors.  
Obstacles to implementation of the reached agreement are those of 
external and internal nature. Five out of twenty-eight EU member states are 
still hesitating to recognize the new state of Kosovo, which is going to fuel 
the radical, anti- Kosovo independence opinions in a group of Serbian 
leaders and individuals. 
Within internal difficulties, Kosovo suffers from weak rule of law 
institutions leading to severe problems with organized crime and high-
                                                 
33 Bosniac paediatrician, Mesud Dzekovic, a customs police officer, a unit controlled by 
EULEX from Lituania, North Mitrovica assembly member Dimitrije Janicijevic, were killed 
in separate attacks, Kosovo assembly member, the ethnic Serb, Petar Miletic was shot in 
front of his apartment in North Mitrovica… 
34 See more about the reached Agreements between two delegations, at Kipred, The 
Implementation of Agreements of Kosovo-Serbia Political Dialogue, Policy Paper No. 
4/13, July 2013. Feasibility Study Working Group for Prishtina-Nis motorway, Exchange 
of Liaison Officers/A special multiethnic Kosovo Police unit to protect Serb Religious and 
Cultural Heritage, Energy/Telecommunications, Special Fund for Northern Kosovo, First 
Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, Association of Serbian 
Municipalities, Justice, Law on Amnesty, Integrated Border-Boundary Management (IBM), 
Regional Representation and Cooperation, Acceptance of the University Diplomas, 
Cadastral Records, Customs Stamps, Freedom of Movement, Civil Registry Books …  
35 Ethnic Serb politician shot dead in Kosovo, by Fatos Bytyqi, available from: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/uk-kosovo-murder-
idUKBREA0F0RZ20140116, last accessed 15 January, 2014. 
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level of corruption. Kosovo and other Albanians in the region are not at 
peace if the same solution is not given for the Albanians in the south of 
Serbia. 
Partition of Kosovo, as a radical view for solving the problem of Kosovo, 
as that of exchanging territories, will slow steps toward normalization of 
relations in region. 
Eventhough criticized, the agreement is a corner stone for further peace-
building activities and reduction of the tensions. 
In order to simplify achievements data from the dialogue, I will present 
them cumulated in the table and they will be attributed as positive or 
negative to the parties, or for both parties in the dialogue.  
 
Table 2: Benefits from the negotiation process between Kosovo and 
Serbia 
No Issue for Kosovo for Serbia For both 
countries  
1. State sovereignty  Positive  Negative  
2. Implementation of Kos.law Positive Negative  
3. Institutional building   Positive 
4. Dissolution of Serb. Struct.    Positive 
5. Human Rights   Positive 
6. International Integrations  Dificult Pozitive  
7. Economic development   Positive 
8. Peace promotion   Positive 
9. International recognitions Partly posit. Negative  
10. Life quality   Positive 
11. Freedom of movement   Positive 
12. Serbs at Kosovo policy   Positive 
13. Relations Kosovo-Serbia   Positive-relaxed 
14. Municipal Association  Negative Positive  
15. Kosovo Police  Positive Positive 
16. Sort of autonomy Negative Positive  
17. Justice Negative Positive  
18. Security Forces  Negative Positive  
19. International relations   Positive 
20. Association of one ethnicity Negative Positive Ethnic division  
21. Border management   Positive 
Source: Authors’ own information 
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Based on the ongoing results of negotiations, claims and benefits, it 
appears that they are following win-win solution; citizens of the Republic 
of Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs, and Serbian policy of insistence on caring 
out the interest of Serbs, will profit from the dialogue. Another aspect of 
Serbia benefits is that of enormous political and economic integration, as 
well as EU membership. For Kosovo the long and difficult process of 
integration, accession to EU, will begin. The best and recommended 
solution is that of parallel accession.  
Negotiation performance of leaders in the process, with the time, went 
in opposite directions: high and rationally for the Prime Minister Thaçi 
from the beginning until the agreement rejection by the Serbian side, which 
will mark the fall at the end; and irrationally low at the beginning for the 
Serbian Prime Minister Dačić, until the refusal of the draft agreement, to be 
mounted after this stage, filled with the benefits of its options in 
subsequent rounds of negotiation. 
The dialogue between the parties has been a battle in protecting the 
constitution of Kosovo by the Kosovo side and the tendency to damage it as 
much as possible by the Serbian side. Based on the limited available data 
one can indicate that the agreement is incomplete and ambiguous starting 
from its name; the possibility of the Serbian government interfering in the 
functioning of the Association of Serb Municipalities, municipal power 
asymmetry, introducing autonomous powers in the north regarding police, 
judiciary, economy, education, rural issues and, most importantly, ethnic 
delineations. This leaves room for further instability actions of malfunction 
in the constitutionality of Kosovo. Achieved agreement based on ethnic 
divides, proved once again functioning difficulties within Kosovo society, 
at least at this stage. Implementation of this "deal" will encounter 
implementing barriers not only by the both extremes parts. Here, also the 
systemic factors will interfere (Russia or any other) and turn it into an 
endless process of negotiation at the expense of the new state. Serbia, its 
leaders, despite the rhetoric of "not recognizing of Kosovo by Serbia", imply 
the new reality created in and around Kosovo, but that will be extended in 
time. However, primarily, unitary character of the definitions is stored by 
the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, but with the obstacles which 
will reduce the rush towards international integration. 
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Rational decision of the key players in the negotiations was influenced 
by the external political environment and economic pressures within 
countries emerging from the war. The U.S. would like to conclude the 
"trouble in the Balkans", while the EU as the main donor to the country and 
as the biggest trading bloc in the world, producing nearly quarter of the 
world's Gross National Product, will try to determine "the last Balkans 
unsolved issue in its yard". Both global influencing actors on resolving the 
Kosovo issue, USA and EU, will rely on political and emotional links that 
Kosovo has with USA, and economic aid and the possibility of future 
accession which the EU provides to Kosovo and Serbia, as a basement to 
sustainable peace building and reconciliation between two nations, which 
share one of the biggest hatreds, in Europe. 
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